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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : Case No. 940602-CA 
MARK J. HOBEL, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant.: 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from conditional pleas of guilty to one 
count of possession of a counterfeit substance (methamphetamine) 
with intent to distribute, a second degree felony, and one count of 
possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute 
(marijuana) , a third degree felony, both in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 58-37-8(1) (a) (iv) (1994), and one count of violation of the 
Illegal Drug Stamp Tax Act, a third degree felony, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-19-106 (1994) . This Court has jurisdiction 
over the appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (f) (1994) . 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AND 
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Did the magistrate properly determine that the affidavit 
in support of the search warrant was sufficient to support a 
finding of probable cause? 
"In reviewing the magistrate's finding of probable cause to 
support a search warrant based on an affidavit, we will find the 
warrant invalid only if the magistrate, given the totality of the 
circumstances, lacked a 'substantial basis' for determining that 
probable cause existed." State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1260 
(Utah 1993). A reviewing court examines the affidavit as a whole, 
in a common-sense fashion, and accords the magistrate's decision 
great deference. Id. at 1260. 
2. Did the trial court properly determine that the officer 
acted in good faith in relying on the search warrant? 
A trial court's finding that an officer relied in good faith 
on a defective search warrant is subject to a de novo review by the 
appellate court. State v. Rowe, 806 P.2d 730, 738 (Utah App. 
1991), rev'd on other grounds, 850 P.2d 427 (Utah 1992). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Any relevant provisions, statutes, or rules are cited in the 
body of the brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Based on information provided by a confidential informant, a 
police officer serving as supervisor of the Iron and Beaver 
Counties Narcotics Task Force prepared an affidavit to support a 
search warrant, which was then duly signed by a magistrate (R. 59-
64 or addendum a) . Pursuant to the warrant, police officers 
searched a home, located drugs in the home, and arrested defendant 
(R. 4) . Defendant subsequently moved to suppress the evidence (R. 
12) . After a hearing on the matter, the trial court issued a 
written memorandum opinion and order denying the motion (R 53-57). 
Defendant then entered a conditional guilty plea to all three 
charges, from which he now appeals on the same grounds he asserted 
in his suppression motion (R. 75-82, 103). 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On October 27, 1993, during an early morning drug raid, Robert 
Yates was arrested and charged with two second degree felonies (R. 
62-63, 117). At the county jail, Yates spoke with Garth Wilkinson, 
supervisor of the Iron/Beaver Counties Narcotics Task Force and a 
police officer with 26 years of experience (R* 116, 120). Yates, 
the confidential informant in this case, detailed information to 
Wilkinson about a local drug operation (R. 62-63 or addendum a; R. 
55 or addendum b). The facts Yates provided were that: 
a. there were two Mexican males present in a 
clearly identified house who regularly 
delivered large quantities of drugs to 
Iron County, 
b. that one speaks English, the other does 
not, 
c. that the one who speaks English is called 
"Marcos," 
d. that within the preceding 24 hours the 
informant had observed five pounds of 
marijuana and one quarter pound of 
methamphetamine in the house, 
e. that the informant had previously 
purchased controlled substances from 
"Marcos" at that house on several 
occasions, 
£• that there is a dog at the residence 
named "Ginger," also referred to as "Here 
Dog" which is vicious and will bite, 
g. that the informant was in the residence 
the previous night and observed rrarijuana 
and methamphetamine in a large fcrtlocker 
and digital scales in "Marcos'" dresser 
drawer, 
h. that to prove his trustworthiness, the 
confidential informant claimed he could 
identify several drug traffickers in the 
Iron County area, 
i. that the confidential informant then 
identified seven individuals known to the 
affiant [i.e. Officer Wilkinson] to be 
involved in the selling and buying of 
narcotics in the Iron County area. 
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(R. 55 or addendum b). In connection with this information, the 
Iron County attorney offered Yates a plea bargain on the condition 
that the information he provided proved to be correct (R. 62 or 
addendum a). 
Based on an affidavit containing the information detailed by 
Yates, the magistrate issued a search warrant for the Marcos 
residence. In the resultant search, police officers discovered 
approximately five and a half pounds of marijuana and one and a 
half ounces of methamphetamine (R. 27) . Defendant, who was in the 
home, was arrested and charged with one count of possession of a 
counterfeit substance (methamphetamine) with intent to distribute, 
a second degree felony; one count of possession of a controlled 
substance with intent to distribute (marijuana) , a second degree 
felony; and violation of the Illegal Drug Stamp Tax Act, a second 
degree felony (R. 72-73). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant first asserts that the affidavit in support of the 
search warrant was insufficient to support the magistrate's 
probable cause determination. This argument turns on the 
informant's reliability, which defendant attacks on several 
grounds: that the informant was acting solely out of self-interest; 
that the informant was under the influence of drugs; that the 
informant provided inconsistent information; and several lesser 
grounds. 
Defendant's string of factors, however, ignores other 
important circumstances. For example, the informant based his 
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factual account on personal observations made inside the target 
home within 24 hours of talking to the police. In addition, the 
informant provided considerable detail in his factual account. 
And, finally, the officer tested the informant's veracity by asking 
him to provide certain drug-related information that the officer 
personally knew to be true. Considering the totality of the 
circumstances, the magistrate had a substantial basis for 
determining that probable cause for the issuance of the warrant 
existed. 
Even if the warrant was found to be defective, however, the 
officers acted in good faith, thus precluding suppression of any 
evidence obtained pursuant to the warrant. Defendant has simply 
provided no credible record support for his assertion that the 
officers acted recklessly in relying on the warrant. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
THE MAGISTRATE PROPERLY DETERMINED THAT THE 
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF THE SEARCH WARRANT WAS 
SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT A FINDING OF PROBABLE 
CAUSE 
The law is clear that " [b]efore issuing a search warrant, a 
neutral magistrate must review an affidavit containing specific 
facts sufficient to support a finding of probable cause." State v. 
Purser, 828 P.2d 515, 517 (Utah App. 1992) (citing State v. 
Babbell, 770 P.2d 987, 990 (Utah 1989), cert, denied. 502 U.S. 1036 
(1992)). A magistrate determining whether probable cause exists 
makes "a practical common-sense decision whether, given all the 
circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, including the 
5 
'veracity' and 'basis of knowledge' of persons supplying hearsay 
information, there is a fair probability that contraband or 
evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place." Illinois 
v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983). 
On appeal, considering the affidavit in its entirety, the 
reviewing court "determine[s] whether the issuing magistrate had a 
substantial basis for concluding that there were enough facts 
within the affidavit to find that probable cause existed." State 
v. Collard, 810 P.2d 884, 885 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 817 P.2d 
327 (Utah 1991) (citing State v. Babbell, 770 P.2d at 991, cert, 
denied, 502 U.S. 1036 (1992)). If, under the totality of the 
circumstances, this threshold is reached, then the reviewing 
court's work is done. See State v. Hansen, 732 P.2d 127, 130 (Utah 
1987) (citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. at 230, 233-34) . This is 
a deferential standard of review. State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d at 
1260. 
In this case, defendant attacks only the informant's 
reliability, citing a string of factors that he believes undermine 
the informant's reliability and, therefore, support his assertion 
that the affidavit was insufficient to support a probable cause 
determination (See Br. of App. at 7-8). When all of the factors 
relevant to the informant's reliability are considered, however, 
defendant's argument must fail. 
First, defendant claims that the informant was unreliable 
because he had been charged with two felonies "and would have done 
anything to get out of his situation" (Br. of App. at 7) . The very 
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fact that Yates was cooperating with the police in order to lessen 
his own criminal liability, however, only served to bolster his 
motivation to provide truthful information. State v. Buford, 820 
P.2d 1381, 1385 (Utah App. 1991) . Plainly, if the information the 
informant provided proved to be false, the plea bargain would be 
negated and the informant would receive no benefit (R. 62 or 
addendum a). 
Defendant makes much of State v. Potter, 860 P.2d 952 (Utah 
App. 1993) , a case he believes "is directly on point" (Br. of App. 
at 5). While defendant never specifically elucidates in what 
respect he believes this to be so, presumably he is referring to 
the fact that the informant in Potter provided information in order 
to receive a break, and so was inherently more suspect than a 
citizen informant with nothing to gain from the interaction. See 
State v. Potter, 860 P.2d at 957. The crux of Potter, however, is 
its evaluation of the totality of the circumstances, which revealed 
that the detective included allegations in the affidavit that were 
directly contrary to observations he had personally made inside the 
target home. In essence, the detective not only failed to provide 
any corroboration for the informant's data but also misled the 
magistrate by withholding material information that bore directly 
on the reliability of the informant. Id. Plainly, no such 
circumstances are present in this case. 
Second, defendant asserts that when the informant was arrested 
and provided the police with information and entered the plea 
bargain, he was under the influence of drugs. He argues that the 
7 
officer should have known this and, consequently, not relied on the 
informant (Br. of App. at 8) -1 At the suppression hearing, 
however, Officer Wilkinson testified repeatedly that Yates did not 
appear to him to be under the influence of drugs (R. 117, 120, 
121) . Furthermore, the trial court, in its written opinion and 
order, specifically found "that there is no credible evidence that 
Mr. Wilkinson knew the informant was under the influence of drugs 
during their discussion of the information included in his 
affidavit" (R. 56 or addendum b) . Under the circumstances of this 
case, the magistrate simply chose to believe the officer rather 
than the proffered testimony of the informant. The law is well-
settled that credibility determinations belong uniquely to the 
trier of fact. See, e.g. , State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1213 (Utah 
1993); State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 784 (Utah 1991); State v. 
Baalev, 681 P.2d 1242, 1244 (Utah 1984). Absent a demonstration of 
clear error, not present here, defendant's claim must fail. 
Third, defendant asserts that the informant provided 
inconsistent information about the quantity of drugs to be found in 
the home (Br. of App. at 8) . Defendant does not, however, point to 
any place in the record supporting this alleged inconsistency. 
Where defendant provides no evidentiary support for his naked 
assertion, this Court should refuse to consider the allegation. 
See, e.g. , State v. Seel, 827 P.2d 954, 959, cert, denied, 836 P.2d 
1383 (Utah 1992). 
1
 At the suppression hearing, the parties stipulated that the 
informant would have so testified (R. 122-23). 
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Defendant's other contentions are equally without merit. That 
Yates had never previously served as an informant should not count 
against him, although the reverse — that someone had provided 
reliable information in the past -- would establish veracity on a 
subsequent occasion. State v. Hansen, 732 P.2d at 130; State v. 
Bailev, 675 P.2d 1203, 1206 (Utah 1984) ; see also United States v. 
Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 580-81 (1971) (discussing with approval case 
in which informant's information provided on previous occasion 
contributed to reliability). Similarly, that the officer did not 
personally know the informant and had no personal knowledge of the 
specific facts alleged in this case is not dispositive in light of 
the totality of the circumstances described. Finally, defendant 
asserts that the informant failed to provide a description of the 
premises to be searched (Br. of App. at 8) . The trial court 
opinion plainly states, however, that the informant took the police 
officer to the target home "for identification purposes so a proper 
description could be included in the affidavit" (R. 54 or addendum 
b) . Surely, the physical act of taking the officer to the home may 
be equated with a verbal description of the place. 
Although defendant has focused on the reliability of the 
informant, he has not examined all of the circumstances that 
contributed to the magistrate's determination.2 For example, 
defendant has ignored the fact that the informant's basis of 
2
 Defendant's fundamental misunderstanding of reliability is 
evidenced by his reference to the "reliability test" articulated in 
State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 782 (Utah 1991) (Br. of App. at 8-
9). Ramirez deals specifically with the reliability of eyewitness 
testimony and has nothing at all to do with the facts of this case. 
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knowledge was personal, arising from observations he had made 
within 24 hours in the target home. "Courts have 
consistently approved the issuance of search warrants where the 
informant's knowledge is based on personal experience." State v. 
Purser, 828 P.2d 515, 517 (Utah App. 1992) (citing State v. Hansen, 
732 P.2d at 130; State v. Brown, 798 P.2d 284, 287 (Utah App. 
1990); State v. Stromberg, 783 P.2d 54, 57 (Utah App. 1989), cert, 
denied, 795 P.2d 1138 (1990)). Where, as here, the informant's 
knowledge was based on personal observation, the "basis of 
knowledge" aspect of the totality-of-the-circumstances analysis is 
amply fulfilled. State v. Purser, 828 P.2d at 517. 
As to the informant's veracity, defendant has also ignored the 
detailed nature of the facts the informant described, a factor that 
buttresses the reliability of the information. State v. Purser, 
828 P.2d at 517; State v. Brown, 798 P.2d at 284. The informant 
observed quantities of drugs, identified by both type and amount. 
He identified the precise location where they would be found, down 
to the piece of furniture, a footlocker. He also described the 
precise kind of scales, digital, and the fact that they would be 
found in a particular dresser drawer. He identified the occupants 
of the house, including the dog. He was able to take the officers 
to the target home and identify it. All of this information was 
contained in the affidavit. 
Furthermore, in order to test the informant's reliability 
against independent information Officer Wilkinson himself knew to 
be true, the officer asked the informant to identify other drug 
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dealers in the area (R. 62 or addendum a) . The informant did so by 
naming seven individuals whom Officer Wilkinson knew to be involved 
in the Iron County drug trade. This independent identification of 
drug-related information further bolstered the informant's veracity 
in the eyes of the officer. State v. Purser, 828 P.2d at 517. 
Based on the totality of circumstances presented by the facts 
commemorated in the affidavit, the magistrate had a substantial 
basis for finding that probable cause existed for the issuance of 
the warrant. This Court should, therefore, affirm the trial 
court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress. 
POINT TWO 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DETERMINED THAT THE 
OFFICER EXECUTING THE WARRANT ACTED IN AN 
OBJECTIVELY REASONABLE MANNER 
The United States Supreme Court has held that "[e]vidence 
obtained by officers acting in good faith, objectively and 
reasonably relying on a search warrant issued by a neutral and 
detached magistrate, need not be excluded even if the warrant is 
subsequently invalidated by a lack of probable cause." State v. 
Horton, 848 P.2d 708, 711, cert, denied, 857 P.2d 948 (Utah 1993) 
(citing United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922 (1984)). Because 
the exclusionary rule is aimed at deterring unlawful police 
conduct, where an officer acts in an objectively reasonable manner, 
there is simply no rationale for exclusion. United States v. Leon, 
468 U.S. at 920-23. 
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Defendant's argument is that the officer's reliance on the 
allegedly defective warrant was reckless and, therefore, that the 
good faith exception to the warrant requirement should not apply.3 
To support his allegation of recklessness, defendant lists 
many of the same factors he asserted in his first argument, 
specifically that: 1) the officer should have known the informant 
was under the influence of drugs; 2) the informant had something to 
gain from providing information; 3) the officer had never used the 
informant before; 4) the officer had no personal knowledge of the 
activities in the Marcos home; and 5) the officer did not attempt 
to verify the informant's information (Br. of App. at 9-10). 
None of these factors, however, is sufficient to overcome 
the presumption that the officer in this case acted in good faith. 
See United States v. Cardall, 773 F.2d 1128, 1133 (10th Cir. 1985) 
(recognizing presumption of good faith reliance). Thus, even if 
this Court determines that the warrant was defective, suppression 
would not be appropriate because there is no objectively 
unreasonable police conduct to deter. United States v. Leon, 468 
U.S. at 920-23. 
First, the trial court did not believe that the informant was 
under the influence of drugs, nor was the court convinced that 
being under the influence of drugs would have necessarily rendered 
the informant's information unreliable (R. 56, 113) . Second, that 
3
 Defendant does not assert any violation of his state 
constitutional rights. Therefore, this Court's analysis should 
proceed solely under federal constitutional law. See, e.g., State 
v. Horton, 848 P.2d at 710-711. 
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the informant would personally benefit only if he provided accurate 
information weighs in favor of reasonable, rather than reckless, 
reliance by the officer. Finally, while the officer had never used 
this informant before and did not himself have personal knowledge 
of the facts,4 he did his best to verify the information by 
soliciting from the informant other, related facts that he could 
personally verify. 
The trial court determined that "the officers clearly acted in 
an objectively reasonable manner in relying on the search warrant 
in this case" (R. 53 or addendum b). In explaining this ruling, 
the court continued: 
The officers here simply repeated the 
observation of the informant, had him lead 
them to the residence, attempted to verify his 
credibility by checking his claim of knowledge 
of others involved in drug trafficking in the 
County and honestly related what they knew to 
the magistrate. Suppression of the evidence 
serves no legitimate purpose in such a 
situation as there is no evidence of police 
misconduct to be deterred. 
(R. 53 or addendum b) . The trial court ruling accurately 
represents the evidence before both the magistrate who signed the 
warrant and the officers who relied upon that warrant. Because 
there was no credible evidence that the officer's reliance on the 
warrant was "wholly unwarranted," this Court should affirm the 
trial court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress. State v. 
Horton, 848 P.2d at 711, cert, denied, 857 P.2d 948 (Utah 1993). 
4
 One might question why an officer would bother with an 




For the reasons stated, this Court should affirm the trial 
court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress. 
ORAL ARGUMENT 
The State does not request oral argument in this case. 




JOANNE C. SLOTNIK 
Assistant Attorney General 
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR IRON COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF IRON ) 
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT 
BEFORE THE HONORABLE J. PHILIP EVES, FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT JUDGE, IN AND 
FOR IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH: 
The undersigned, being first duly sworn deposes and says: 
That your Affiant, Garth Wilkinson, is a peace officer employed by the Utah Department 
of Public Safety, presently assigned as the Supervisor to the Iron/Beaver Counties Narcotics Task 
Force, has been a peace officer for in excess of twenty-four (24) years, and has reason to believe 
the following, to wit: 
That within a certain residence known as the •Marcos" residence, said residence being 
more particularly described as a white frame home, with green trim, located on 2400 North and 
Lund Highway in Iron County, State of Utah, said residence fronted by a dirt road on the north 
side, and facing in a southerly direction, with a white travel trailer on the southwest side of said 
residence, and a large stack of hay also located on the southwest side of said residence, 
surrounded by several large trees and being the only residence between 2S00 North and Lund 
Highway on the north side of the dirt road; and moreover, that within a certain Jeep Cherokee, 
white in color, license plate number unknown, said vehicle being parked in front of the afore-
described residence, your affiant has reason to believe there is now certain property or evidence 
described as: 
Controlled substances including marijuana and methamphetamine, 
together with papers, checks, bills, notes, or other documents 
relating to the purchase and sale of controlled substances; 
and that said property or evidence is unlawfully acquired or unlawfully possessed, has been used 
or is being possessed with a purpose to use it as a means of committing or concealing a public 
offense, and consists of an item or constitutes evidence of illegal conduct, possessed by a party 
to the illegal conduct. 
I believe the property and evidence described above is evidence of the crimes of 
Possession of Methamphetamine with Intent to Distribute, a Second-Degree Felony, and 
Possession of Marijuana with Intent to Distribute, a Third-Degree Felony. The facts to establish 
the grounds for issuance of a search warrant are as follows: 
1. On October 27, 1993, your affiant oversaw a "drug raid" involving fifteen (15) 
peace officers in Iron County, State of Utah, serving nineteen (19) felony warrants on persons 
charged with felony drug distribution in Iron County. 
2. On this date, your affiant was present during the arrest of an individual charged 
with distributing methamphetamine (hereinafter referred to as "C.I." representing "confidential 
informant"). Said C.I. told me the following, to wit: (a) that at the MMarcos" residence set forth 
above, there are presently two (2) male Mexican individuals who travel to Iron County, State of 
Utah, on a regular basis to deliver large quantities of marijuana and methamphetamine, (b) that 
the only individual he knows by name is called "Marcos" and he speaks English, but the other 
individual does not speak English, (c) that the C.I. was at the residence within the last twenty-
four (24) hours and observed approximately five (5) pounds of marijuana and approximately one-
quarter (1/4) pound of the controlled substance methamphetamine, (d) that said C.I. has purchased 
controlled substances from "Marcos" at the location described herein on several prior occasions, 
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and (e) that said CI. could identify several other persons in the Iron County area who have 
purchased marijuana, methamphetamine, and cocaine from "Marcos" at that location. 
3. That your affiant asserts that the C.I. is trustworthy and has provided reliable 
information in that said CI. was asked to inform your affiant of all known drug buyers, users, 
and sellers in the Iron County area, and said CI. told me of seven (7) individuals who are selling 
or buying quantities of narcotics in Iron County. Your affiant, as a supervisor of the Narcotics 
Task Force, can verify that the information provided by CI. is trustworthy and reliable. 
Moreover, your affiant asserts that the information is reliable in that CI. is presently charged with 
two (2) second-degree felonies and has been offered a plea agreement by the Iron County 
Attorney wherein CI. would plead guilty to a third-degree felony in the event the information 
is correct and there are large quantities of methamphetamine and marijuana at said residence 
and/or vehicle. 
4. That your affiant asserts that I believe the information is trustworthy and reliable 
in that CI. states CI. was at the residence last night, observed the marijuana and 
methamphetamine in a "large foot locker" and also observed digital scales for weighing controlled 
substances in "Marcos'" dresser drawer. 
5. That your affiant was informed by CI. that CI. believes "Marcos" and the other 
unidentified male Mexican may attempt to flee the area if they observe narcotics officers. 
Moreover, CI. informs me that they have a dog by the name of "Ginger" or also referred to as 
"Here dog" who is vicious and will bite. Finally, CI. informs me that "Marcos" and the other 
unidentified male have informed CI. that they are closely associated with the "Mexican mafia" 
and that they may be dangerous and may pose a threat of violence to officers serving a search 
warrant. 
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6. WHEREFORE, your affiant prays that a Search Warrant be issued for the seizure 
of said items at the residence and/or within the vehicle which have been more particularly 
described herein, said search warrant to be served in the daytime and without notice by law 
enforcement officers. 




Iron/Beaver Counties Narcotics Task Force 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me t h i s ^ / f f dav of October, 1993, at the 
hour of I^Ot P.m. 
a 9HILIP 
fifth District Judge 
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR IRON COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
SEARCH WARRANT 
COUNTY OF IRON, STATE OF UTAH 
To any peace officer in the State of Utah: 
Proof by affidavit under oath having been made this day before me by Garth Wilkinson, 
Supervisor of the Iron/Beaver Counties Narcotics Task Force, I am satisfied that within a certain 
residence known as the 'Marcos" residence, said residence being more particularly described as 
a white frame home, with green trim, located on 2400 North and Lund Highway in Iron County, 
State of Utah, said residence fronted by a dirt road on the north side, and facing in a southerly 
direction, with a white travel trailer on the southwest side of said residence, and a large stack of 
hay also located on the southwest side of said residence, surrounded by several large trees and 
being the only residence between 2500 North and Lund Highway on the north side of the dirt 
road; and moreover, that within a certain Jeep Cherokee, white in color, license plate number 
unknown, said vehicle being parked in front of the afore-described residence, your affiant has 
reason to believe there is now certain property or evidence described as: 
Controlled substances including marijuana and methamphetamine, 
together with papers, checks, bills, notes, or other documents 
relating to the purchase and sale of controlled substances; 
and that said property or evidence is unlawfully acquired or unlawfully possessed, is being 
possessed with the purpose to use it as a means of committing or concealing a public offense and 
consists of an item or constitutes evidence of illegal conduct, possessed by a party to the illegal 
conduct. 
YOU ARE THEREFORE COMMANDED: in the daytime, to make a search of the 
above-named or described premises and vehicle, for the hereinabove described property or 
evidence, without announcing your presence as police officers and without notice, and if you find 
the same or any part thereof, to bring it forthwith before me at the Fifth Judicial District Court, 
County of Iron, State of Utah, or retain such property in your custody, subject to the order of this 
Court. 
Given under my hand this day of October, 1993, at the hour of /AWf A.m. 




Flr'T1: CISTR'CT COURT 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL ri^^ftnl 9 RN ? $\ 
\GH CO 
RY ^ -
IN AND FOR IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH IROi< COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 




Criminal No. 931500703 
This matter came on for hearing on defendant's Motion to Suppress on April 4, 1994. 
The State was represented by Scott M. Burns, Iron County Attorney, the defendant was present 
and represented by James M. Park, his attorney. The Court heard brief evidence and oral 
argument on the matter. The Court, having now reviewed the file and the authorities cited by 
the parties, hereby enters the following decision and order. 
In his written motion, defendant asserts that the affidavit in support of the search warrant 
is insufficient to establish probable cause and that the "good faith" doctrine of United States vs. 
Leon. 468 U. S. 897 (1984) should not be applied. At oral argument defendant also seemed to 
raise the issue that the confidential informant was under the influence of drugs when he was 
questioned by the affiant officer and that the officer failed to include that information in the 
affidavit. 
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The affiant officer, Garth E. Wilkinson, was called to testify. He testified that he has 
over twenty years of experience in law enforcement and over 9 years experience in narcotics 
investigations almost exclusively. He testified that he is familiar with symptoms of drug 
intoxication and that the confidential informant did not exhibit any evidence of being under the 
influence of drugs during the interview. 
The Court finds that there is no credible evidence that Mr. Wilkinson knew the informant 
was under the influence of drugs during their discussion of the information included in his 
affidavit. Likewise there is no evidence that Mr. Wilkinson concealed any known information 
from the magistrate. 
Turning to the issues raised in the written motion, the court must first consider whether 
the affidavit supporting the search warrant is sufficient to establish probable cause. 
The law of this State is clear that the Court must employ the "totality of the 
circumstances" test in making this determination. fSee State v. Thurman. 846 P. 2d (Utah 1993); 
State v. Hansen. 732 P. 2d 127 (Utah 1987).] Probable cause is determined by a magistrate 
who "make(s) a practical common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth 
in the affidavit. . ., including the 'veracity' and the 'basis of knowledge' of persons supplying 
hearsay information, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be 
found in a particular place." (See State vs. Viph. 234 Utah Adv. Reports 44, 45.) 
The affidavit here contains 9 paragraphs, some numbered and some unnumbered. The 
affidavit states that on October 27, 1993, the affiant oversaw a large drug roundup in Iron 
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County. One of those arrested was the confidential informant. The informant then told the 
affiant certain detailed information including: 
a. there were two Mexican males present in a clearly identified house who regularly 
delivered large quantities of drugs to Iron County, 
b. that one speaks English, the other does not, 
c. that the one who speaks English is called "Marcos", 
d. that within the preceding 24 hours the informant had observed five pounds of 
marijuana and one quarter pound of methamphetamine in the house, 
e. that the informant had previously purchased controlled substances from "Marcos" 
at that house on several occasions, 
f. that there is a dog in the residence named "Ginger", also referred to as "Here dog" 
which is vicious and will bite, 
g. that the informant was in the residence the previous night and observed marijuana 
and methamphetamine in a large footlocker and digital scales in "Marcos' " 
dresser drawer, 
h. that to prove his trustworthiness, the confidential informant claimed he could 
identify several drug traffickers in the Iron County area, 
i. that the confidential informant then identified seven individuals known to 
the affiant to be involved in the selling and buying of narcotics in the Iron 
County area. 
At the hearing on the motion the affiant testified, at the defendant's request, and said that 
the informant took him to the "Marcos" home for identification purposes so a proper description 
could be included in the affidavit. 
The magistrate, heaving read the affidavit, determined that there was probable cause to 
believe that there were drugs on the premises and a search warrant was issued which resulted 
in the discovery and seizure of a large quantity of marijuana and methamphetamine. 
The defendant claims that the Utah case of State v. Potter. 221 Utah Adv. Rep. 28 (Utah 
1993) is dispositive of this case. This Court disagrees. The Potter case stands for the 
proposition that officers may not rely on assertions in an affidavit when they know, or should 
know, that the assertions are false. No such circumstance arises in this case. Here the 
confidential informant relayed information based on his own, personal observations within hours 
of the execution of the affidavit. He had observed large quantities of drugs, he knew the types 
of drugs, and he knew there were scales of a particular type in a particular place. He related 
in some detail who was in the house, right down to the dog. He led the officers to and 
identified the house. Clearly his claimed knowledge was based on personal observation. 
In an effort to determine whether they should rely on his assertions, the officers asked 
the informant to name those persons involved in buying and selling drugs in Iron County, since 
the informant claimed to be a frequent customer at the Marcos house. The informant named 
seven persons known to the affiant as buyers and sellers of drugs. 
Under the totality of the circumstances, common sense would indicate that there was a 
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fair probability that drugs would be found in the Marcos house. 
The State also argues that even if the affidavit is insufficient, the Court should apply the 
"good faith" exception articulated in U. S. v. Leon, supra and refuse to suppress the evidence. 
The Court agrees with this argument. 
If the affidavit does not establish probable cause, the officers clearly acted in an 
objectively reasonable manner in relying on the search warrant in this case. Unlike Potter there 
is no evidence in this case that would indicate that the magistrate . • . "was misled by 
information in the affidavit which the affiant knew was false or would have known was false 
except for his reckless disregard for the truth." (See U. S. v. Leon. 468 U.S. 897, 923.) 
The officers here simply repeated the observations of the informant, had him lead them 
to the residence, attempted to verify his credibility by checking his claim of knowledge of others 
involved in drug trafficking in the County and honestly related what they knew to the magistrate. 
Suppression of the evidence serves no legitimate purpose in such a situation as there is no 
evidence of police misconduct to be deterred. (See State vs. Potter. 221 U. A. R. 29, 31.) 
The defendant's Motion is denied. 
